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Abstract:  
Combating the surge of illegal wildlife trade (IWT) devastating wildlife populations is an 
urgent global priority for conservation. There are increasing policy commitments to take 
action at the local community level as part of effective responses. However, there is scarce 
evidence that in practice such interventions are being pursued and there is scant 
understanding regarding how they can help. Here we set out a conceptual framework to guide 
efforts to effectively combat IWT through actions at community level. This framework is 
based on articulating the net costs and benefits involved in supporting conservation vs 
supporting IWT, and how these incentives are shaped by anti-IWT interventions. Using this 
framework highlights the limitations of an exclusive focus on "top-down", enforcement-led 
responses to IWT. These responses can distract from a range of other approaches that shift 
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incentives for local people toward supporting conservation rather than IWT, as well as in 
some cases actually decrease the net incentives in favour of wildlife conservation. 
 
Main Text:  
Introduction: 
The illegal wildlife trade crisis  
Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) in wild species and products – ranging from rhino horn and elephant 
ivory, to medicinal plants, timber, shark fins and pangolins – is an urgent global conservation 
challenge that has escalated dramatically in the last decade (Challender and MacMillan 2014; 
Wittemyer et al. 2014).  
Since 2012, this crisis has attracted in excess of US$350 million in donor and government 
funding (Duffy and Humphreys 2014), and prompted high-level intergovernmental policy 
initiatives including the London (2014) and Kasane (2015) Conferences on IWT, the African 
Union's International Conference on Illegal Exploitation and Illicit Trade in Wild Flora and 
Fauna in Africa (Brazzaville; 2015), a UN General Assembly Resolution (2015), and relevant 
commitments in the Sustainable Development Goals (2015). In terms of addressing poaching in 
source countries (as distinct from demand in consumer states) these policy commitments 
emphasise two broad areas: law enforcement, and measures focused on communities and 
sustainable livelihoods. However, to date the emphasis in most policy debates and in donor 
resource allocation has been on strengthening state- and private sector-led law enforcement to 
reduce IWT. This enforcement is increasingly militarised in response to increasingly militarised 
poaching and to linkages with terrorism and state security (Duffy 2014; Lunstrum 2014; 
Buscher & Ramutsindela 2016). Militarisation of the anti-poaching response involves the use of 
military and paramilitary personnel (including private military forces), training, and 
technologies (e.g. drones and high-powered weapons) (Lunstrum 2014), and at field level is 
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associated with increasingly punitive and lethal responses against suspected poachers (e.g. 
Makoye 2014; Konopo 2016).  
 
By contrast, community-level interventions to reduce poaching for IWT have attracted far less 
attention and investment (IUCN SULi 2015). Details of how and where community-level 
interventions should be implemented and how they impact IWT remain vague, with designated 
resources and implementation largely lacking. Here we present a conceptual framework that 
highlights the incentives created by different types of policy interventions for local community 
actors to either poach or to protect wildlife. We use this framework to demonstrate the 
limitations to a “top-down” enforcement-only IWT strategy, including that such an approach can 
critically undermine approaches based on community empowerment, engagement, and benefit-
sharing. We argue that diverse community-level approaches should and must be integrated into 
more effective anti-IWT responses. 
 
Incentives shaping community attitudes and behavior in relation to IWT 
Human decisions concerning conservation and exploitation of natural resources are shaped 
fundamentally by the incentives (financial and non-financial costs and benefits) accrued, as well 
as culture, norms, beliefs, values, lifestyles and cognitive factors (Milner-Gulland and Rowcliffe 
2007; St John et al. 2015). How these factors combine to affect individual decision-making 
varies according to both context and individual preferences. Studies in specific contexts have 
highlighted diverse motivations for poaching within communities, including i) the requirement 
to meet subsistence needs, ii) the desire to improve financial well-being or social standing, iii) 
cultural practices and traditions, iv) other non-instrumental motivations such as the desire to 
retaliate for direct losses due to wildlife or for current or historical perceived injustices (Duffy 
2010; Harrison et al. 2015). Community-based conservation (CBC) programmes seek to achieve 
conservation outcomes - including reduced poaching - predominantly by either increasing the 
financial benefits individuals receive through conservation, increasing the opportunity cost of 
behaviours that are incompatible with conservation or by instilling normative compliance 
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through providing public goods (Gibson and Marks 1995). We build on and extend this thinking 
in the context of IWT to develop a conceptual framework for understanding individual decisions 
around poaching (Fig 1). 
 
It is a reasonable assumption that for wildlife conservation to prevail, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition is that the expected net benefits (benefits minus costs) of wildlife 
conservation to community members with the means and opportunity of engaging in IWT must 
be greater than the net benefits (Fig. 1). We include in "conserving wildlife" any action with the 
effect of promoting or furthering conservation, from passive (e.g. tolerating presence of wildlife) 
to active (e.g. protecting wildlife from poaching). Likewise "engaging in IWT" includes any 
action supporting IWT, from passively concealing the identity of poachers to actively 
participating in illegal extraction, trafficking and/or trade. We recognise that the instrumental 
motivations included in this framework are only part of the motivation for individual decision-
making. For example, colonial legacies including the loss of legitimate forms of access to natural 
resources may contribute to poaching as a form of protest (Duffy 2010). However, costs and 
benefits to community members also interact with and shape broader social values and norms 
around conservation and poaching, albeit in complex ways mediated by perceptions of 
legitimacy, local institutions and culture (Scanlon and Cull 2009).  
 
A broad range of financial and non-financial social and economic benefits and costs are 
associated with both conserving wildlife and with engaging in IWT (Fig 1). Critically, 
however, these costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among individuals within a 
community. For instance, some benefits of conserving wildlife accrue to the individual, and 
vary widely according to factors such as gender, ethnicity and status (e.g. gaining 
conservation-related jobs); while others accrue at the community level and are more equitably 
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shared amongst community members (e.g. hunting lease payments to community land rights 
holders) (Naidoo et al. 2016). Likewise poachers can often be distinguished into varying 
types, with different social and economic linkages to local communities (Phelps and Webb 
2015). This conceptual framework will yield different net incentives for different individuals, 
so needs to be applied with attention to the heterogeneity of costs and benefits amongst 
people in a local community, varying types of poachers, and the dynamic nature of payoffs to 
all actors over time.  
To elaborate how this framework can apply to specific community members or poacher types 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we present here a simple conceptual model to help 
structure thinking about the basic conditions that will need to be in place for successful anti-
IWT interventions. There are likely to be some circumstances where community-level 
interventions to help achieve the condition set out in Fig 1 are not applicable; for instance, 
where poaching takes place in remote areas far from settled communities and involving 
mobile gangs of poachers. However, this framework is likely to be relevant wherever the 
behaviours and decisions of local communities living with wildlife affect patterns of IWT, 
including effective provision of intelligence and cooperation in enforcement. 
Applying this conceptual framework to interventions to combat IWT 
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We now consider each component of this framework, setting out how interventions to combat 
IWT can shape key incentives. We then discuss the importance of interaction between the 
payoffs, with specific reference to the impact of state-led enforcement approaches on overall 
incentives for IWT.  
i. Increasing benefits from wildlife conservation 
Some anti-IWT interventions seek to shift incentives by increasing the benefits realized by 
community members from conserving wildlife (Box 1 in Fig 1). This follows the well-established 
logic of common property resource governance theory (Ostrom 1990) and its application to 
wildlife in the form of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) (Hulme and 
Murphree 2001). 
 
Increasing the benefits from conservation can be pursued through approaches such as 
strengthening community ownership rights and/or capacity to use, manage and benefit from 
wildlife (either for subsistence or commercial purposes), including pursuing traditional cultural 
practices linked to wildlife, participating in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes, 
securing jobs as community guards or in nature-based tourism enterprises, or strengthening 
cooperation and communication with conservation/wildlife management agencies (IUCN SULi 
2015 et al.; 2016; Roe 2015). Such benefits can be powerful in motivating communities to be 
active and committed conservation actors against poaching and IWT, as evidenced in 
conservancies in Namibia (Naidoo et al. 2016) and Kenya (Blackburn 2016). Effectiveness of 
different interventions will vary according to local context: for example, benefits from tourism 
are only feasible where certain conditions are met, such as political stability, tourism 
infrastructure and scenic landscapes (Naidoo et al. 2016).  
 
CBC and CBNRM initiatives have failed when the generated benefits have been insufficient to 
offset individual costs, too diffuse to result in the creation of norms in favour of conservation or 
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captured by government/community elites (Gibson and Marks 1995, Child 1995). As such, 
increasing benefits from conservation is likely to be most effective in reducing IWT in those 
cases where the benefit flows to local communities are conditional on conservation outcomes, 
i.e. where better conservation outcomes are associated with increased or more secure benefits 
and vice versa; where benefits are experienced by a significant proportion of the community; 
and where accountability for these positive changes can be demonstrated clearly i.e. where 
changes in conservation status can be clearly attributed to actions of specific people or groups. 
This is the case with many sustainable use approaches, and some PES schemes (e.g. Lewis et al. 
2011; Naidoo et al. 2016).  
ii. Decreasing the costs of living with wildlife   
Promoting conservation over IWT can also involve efforts to reduce costs associated with 
conserving wildlife (Box 2, see Fig 1.), including threats to personal security, livestock or 
crops; resource competition; and disease transmission between livestock and wildlife. 
Communities are often substantially disadvantaged by these impacts, particularly where they 
pose risks to life or livelihoods, leading to anger, resentment and retaliatory poaching 
(Dickman 2010; Twinamatsiko et al. 2014). Interventions to reduce costs can include the 
construction of physical barriers such as fences to keep wildlife away from crops and 
livestock, problem animal control; and insurance or compensation schemes for crops 
damaged by wildlife (Hoare 2012). Reducing these costs may assist (or indeed be necessary) 
in shifting overall incentives for local people away from IWT and in favor of conservation. 
However, alone these interventions are unlikely to be sufficient, particularly in the context of 
escalating prices for illicitly sourced wildlife products (Challender and MacMillan 2014). 
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iii. Reducing the benefits of engaging in IWT 
A third type of anti-IWT intervention at community level aims to reduce the benefits that 
people can gain through engaging in IWT (Box 3 in Fig 1), through means such as reducing 
offtake of wildlife through increasing detection of snares (Linkie et al. 2015) or "devaluing" 
wildlife items e.g. infusing rhino horns with chemicals (Ferreira et al. 2014). While such 
interventions may likewise be important in shifting overall payoffs away from IWT, in most 
cases they will need to be augmented with other approaches to effectively reduce it.  
iv. Increasing costs of engaging in IWT  
The most widely emphasised response to IWT focuses on increasing the costs associated with 
engaging in it (Box 4 in Fig 1). This is typically through state-led (sometimes private) law 
enforcement (Roe et al. 2015a), which can involve tightening restrictions on harvest and 
trade; increasing the probability of detection and capture; increasing the chances of successful 
prosecution; and/or increasing sanctions and penalties (Duffy 2014; St John et al. 2015).  
 
The costs of engaging in IWT can also be increased through approaches that empower and 
engage communities as active and motivated partners in law enforcement (Lotter and Clark 
2014; Naidoo et al. 2016; Roe 2015). In Mali, for example, the Mali Elephant Project has 
supported local communities to establish voluntary game patrols to monitor elephant 
populations and detect poaching incursions (Roe 2015). In many cases, local residents are best 
placed to know what is happening on the ground, including who is poaching and their 
movements - information typically scarce in the IWT context. They can apply social and informal 
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sanctions to members of their communities, and can be the "eyes and ears" of formal 
enforcement authorities as scouts, informants and guides that work cooperatively through joint 
patrols or information sharing (Lotter and Clark 2014; Wilkie, Painter and Jacob 2016). These 
approaches will be strongest where people feel a strong sense of ownership or stewardship 
over wildlife - where they are protecting "their" wildlife (Wilkie, Painter and Jacob 2015). 
Mechanisms can be established to enable people to easily, anonymously and safely report 
information, increasingly through mobile technologies. This is relevant wherever IWT takes 
place in or around areas where communities live, regardless of whether local residents are 
involved in IWT or not. Given the prevalence of IWT driven by "outsiders" and the increasingly 
militarised nature of some IWT, it is vital that community members are not endangered by such 
interventions and they will typically need strong and reliable backup from well-equipped 
authorities with the power of arrest. Ample evidence shows that law enforcement and crime 
prevention is most effective when citizens and armed authorities both contribute (Hawdon and 
Ryan 2011). 
 
A further popular anti-IWT strategy is providing "alternative livelihoods" for local communities, 
understood here as those not based on (legal or illegal) use of wild resources (e.g. small-scale 
farming, retail enterprises).  The most commonly cited rationale for these interventions is that 
by providing an alternative source of income they reduce dependence on income from IWT. 
They also provide a mechanism for occupying limited time and resources that might otherwise 
be allocated to IWT. In some cases, the ability to benefit from alternative livelihoods 
interventions is made conditional on wildlife conservation. In these cases, the interventions 
serve to increase the costs of engaging in IWT (thus falling within Box 4 in Fig 1). However, the 
evidence for the effectiveness of these approaches (in terms of delivering conservation 
outcomes) is scant (Roe et al. 2015b; Wicander and Coad 2014). In particular, it is unclear if the 
provision of benefits from alternative livelihoods interventions replaces or simply supplements 
IWT benefits (Wright et al 2015). There are some examples in which alternative livelihoods 
have been used as one component of a package of interventions to tackle IWT (Lotter and Clark 
2014) or where “reformed poachers associations” have been established on the premise of 
provision of alternative sources of income-earning opportunities (see Harrison et al 2015). But, 
as with other non-conditional conservation incentives, we are sceptical about their wide-scale 
adoption in combating IWT. 
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What's wrong with current approaches? 
The dominant approach to countering IWT based on "top down" enforcement (Fig 2(A)) has 
a number of serious limitations. While regulation and enforcement clearly have an important 
role to play in reducing IWT, an exclusive focus on this element of our framework has 
several potentially perverse collateral impacts: it ignores important ramifications for other 
costs and benefits that shape incentives for IWT; it overlooks the potential for reducing 
incentives for IWT through strategies that change other incentives; and it fails to leverage 
(and indeed may impair) more nuanced and locally engaged forms of monitoring and 
enforcement (e.g. community-led efforts).  
 
Top down (and particularly militarised) enforcement strategies frequently not only change the 
costs of engaging in IWT, but can produce a range of other (sometimes unanticipated) impacts 
that can collectively undermine conservation incentives (see Fig 2(B)). Where enforcement 
efforts are upholding local rights, providing security and/or defending a community's assets 
they will strengthen community benefits from conservation and may well increase support for 
it. But poorly directed or heavy-handed efforts can impose unjustified restrictions on people's 
use of wildlife resources, infringe rights, and undermine the benefits that local people can gain 
from conservation and wildlife protection. Interventions justified by cracking down on IWT can, 
for example, curtail livelihood benefits from legitimate use of wildlife through subsistence use, 
trade, or trophy hunting programmes. Heavy-handed enforcement can further involve unjust 
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persecution, harassment and human rights abuses by authorities (Corry 2015), increasing the 
perceived costs of living alongside wildlife. When people lose benefits and feel increasing costs 
of conservation, this can lead to anger and resentment - traits associated with poaching in some 
studies (Twinamatsiko et al. 2014).  
 
It is also plausible that enforcement-focused strategies (top-down or otherwise) can actually 
increase the individual benefits gained from IWT, when they reduce the supply of illegal 
products but demand remains constant or indeed increases with product rarity (Chen 2015). In 
these circumstances prices for illegal products are expected to continue to rise and may further 
incentivise IWT. 
 
By contrast, approaches that explicitly seek to empower and engage communities in combating 
IWT can harness multiple levers to shift conservation incentives in a positive direction (Fig 
2(C)), while safeguarding and promoting critical human rights and livelihood concerns (see e.g. 
IUCN SULi et al. 2015, pp 15-19). Community-led interventions can motivate community 
members to protect wildlife through simultaneously supporting their rights to benefit from 
wildlife resources and associated sense of ownership, seeking to increase the benefits they gain 
through doing so and minimising the costs, as well as fostering more efficient and powerful 
forms of enforcement through drawing on the energies and capacities of motivated community 
members as active partners in combating IWT. While enforcement plays a critical role in this 
model, it is enforcement that upholds and protects the rights of individual community members, 
rather than potentially undermining them. Integrating these approaches offers a far more 
coherent and, where successful, more powerful package of incentives raising far fewer social 
concerns than purely enforcement-focused interventions. 
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Where to from here? 
Community-based approaches alone are unlikely to be adequate to stem IWT, particularly in 
the face of escalating commodity values for wildlife traded illegally, the militarisation of 
poaching, and the involvement of "outsiders", including sophisticated organised crime 
networks, in IWT (Duffy 2014). A critical need is for better understanding of where and how 
community-level approaches can effectively help combat IWT (Biggs et al. 2016). State-led 
and/or private law enforcement will rightly continue to play an essential role in successful 
natural resource management and in the battle against IWT (Phelps et al. 2014). However, a 
frequent, often narrow preoccupation with this approach may be compromising the 
possibilities for exploring fruitful and complementary pathways that engage and support 
communities – risking the undermining of anti-IWT efforts by alienating or disenfranchising 
local residents in source areas of illicit wildlife goods. Improving relations with communities 
and increasing incentives for conservation – in ways that effectively meet the requirements of 
Fig 1 – creates the necessary backbone for successful enforcement by providing a critically 
needed enabling environment. In addressing the current devastating spate of IWT it is urgent 
and essential that interventions combine the best of both "top-down" enforcement and diverse 
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community-engagement approaches, while always carefully considering the various 
feedbacks and unintended consequences they can cause. 
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